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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Plai~ttiff

and Respondent,

Case No. 7757

vs.
DOUGLAS CHARLES PETERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
, On March 25, 1951, during the nighttime, the Torch
Tavern, 477 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, was
broken into and articles excee~ing $50.00 value were felon·
iously taken therefrom.
Charles L. Means, the owner, closed the tavern at 1:00
a.m., March 25. M. W. Olsen of the City Police Department
2,

"'

·"""
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informed Mr. Means later the same morning of the burglary
and they returned to the tavern where Mr. Means listed
articles missing, subsequently identified at the trial as Exhibits
A, B, C, D and ·E (Tr. 43-52).
Early March 25th witnesses Daniel Dunn and Edward
Peterson were on Fifth South Street approximately 75 feet
east of the Torch 1·avern; both saw a car come out of the
alley parallel with the east side of the Torch Tavern at an
accelerated speed; turn west from the alley on Fifth South;
and continue west at a high rate of· speed. Both noticed this car
because of the high rate of speed and open trunk of the
car which held a dark, square object. Mr. Peterson saw two
persons in the car and noted the license number 484. Both
witnesses investigated the alley 3:nd found· the broken window
and open door of the Torch Tavern. Mr. Peterson testified
that a phone call was placed to the police between 3: 30 and
4:00 a.m.; Mr. Dunn testified that the phone call was placed
to the police at approximately 5 minutes_ to 4:00. a.m.; the
police arrived 8 to 10 minutes later (Tr. 71-103).
Special Officer Jack Merrick, approximately 10 minutes
before 4:00 o'clock on the morning of March 25th, 1951,
saw a car proceeding at a fast speed north on Fifth West near
Second South; he noted two persons in the car with the trunk
forced up with a large object; he followed the car into an
alley betWeen North Temple and South Temple on Fifth
West; two men jumped out of the car and ran and Officer
Merrick chased the driver. He fired tWo shots and the driver
surrendered and identified himself as Chick or Chuck Peterson. Officer Merrick took Chuck Peterson to the Salt Lake
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Planing ~1ills to phone the Salt Lake City Police Dispatcher,
at which time defendant escaped. The phone call was placed
at approximately 4:00 a.m.
Officer Merrick, at the trial, positively identified the defendant as one of the persons he followed in the car, chased
and apprehended (Tr. 103-121).
The numbers of the license plate of the car containing
the stolen articles were 484. The car was owned by the defendant. The articles were identified at the trial as exhibits
A, B, C, D and E (Tr. 106, 107, 123-130).
Defendant later turned himself in to the Salt Lake Police
department and submitted a confession of a third person to
exculpate himself (Tr. 154).
Defendant was convicted of Grand Larceny in the Third
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
and from that verdict appeals.

STATEMENT OF POINTS I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
BY REFUSING TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
EXHIBIT NO. 1.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE TO RETURN A VERDICT OF .f\CQUITAL FOR
DEFENDANT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE SCOPE OF EX5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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AMINATION OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS; THE VERDIC1~
WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
BY REFUSING TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
EXHIBIT NO. 1.
Defendant's proposed Exhibit I was an alleged confession
by Charles Olmsted, offered by defendant to exculpate himself. Respondent submits that the objections by the State to
the admission of the alleged confession as being self-serving
and heresay were well taken and properly sustained by the
Court. Appellant contends that the a,.Ueged confession was
part of the res gestae and thus admissible.
In the case of Dodd v. State (1925) 20 Okla. Cr. 311, 233
Pac. 503, res gestae is defined as follows:
What constitutes res gestae is _often a complex and
difficult question. The term is not capable of a definition which will fit all cases, and of necessity must
be left in some measure to the sound discretion of the
trial court. In general tenus, it means the circumstances,
facts and declarations which shed light upon and expl~in the principal fact, and which are voluntary and
spontaneous in their nature, and so nearly contemporaneous as to preclude the idea of deliberation or fabrication. Price v. State} 1 Okla, Cr. 358, 98 Pac. 447;
34 Cyc. 1642; 22 C. ]. 454, Sec. 543.
In the case of Clingan v. State ( 1919) 15 Okla. Cr. 483,
178 Pac. 486, the court said:
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Spontaneous declarations springing out of and contemporaneous with the principal fact sought to be
proven, and which are made at a time so near to it
as to preclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication
\vhether they be the declarations of the deceased or
of the defendant, are generally considered admissible
as part of the res gestae.
Defendant's testimony was that approximately one hour
and forty-five minute elapsed between his escape a~d the time
he and Olmsted met, when the alleged confession was written
(Tr. 152, 153).
The authorities require that declarations be spontaneous,
contemporaneous, and made at a time which would preclude
deliberation and fabrication to be admissible as part of the
res gestae. The lapse of time and the circumstances under which
the alleged confession was written preclude any spontaniety,
and show ample opportunity for deliberation, collusion,. creation and faslification of an alibi. Neither can an argument be
made_ that the alleged confession was contemporaneous with
the crime, and for that reason admissible.
Respondent submits that the allege4 confession
properly excluded.

Wt3.S

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE TO RETURN A VERDICT OF ACQUITAL FOR
DEFENDANT.
7
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Appellant cites the Utah cases State v. Burch, 100 Utah
414, 115 P 2d 911~ and State v. Wells, 35 Utah 400, 100 P
681, (appellant's brief pages 1~· and 14) for_ the proposition
that where circumstantial evidence is used to prove the guilt
of defendant and the evidence is such-that reasonable men cannot differ upon the fact that it includes a reasonable hypothesis
of innocence of the defendant, the question is one of law for
the Court, and not a question for the jury.
·
Respondent concedes that such was the holding in the
cases cited, but submits that the principle is not applicable to
the case at bar. Appellant fails to point out that the cases
cited had peculiar fact situations and dealt with only circumstantial evidence. In the Burch case this Court stated:
tCThe present case is out of the ordinary in that
there is not one ultimate fact necessary for a conviction
that is substantiated by direct evidence.

* case
*
* In a* criminal

•

a motion for directed verdict
raises the question of whether or not; as a matter of
law, there is substantial evidence of accused's guilt.
State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 266 P 261. See also
State v. Gordon, 28 Utah 15, 76 P 882; State v. Karas,
43 Utah 506, 136 P 788. Where- the alleged offense
and the .accused's alleged connection therewith rest
wholly upon circumstantial evidence, which evidence,
as a matter of law, is reasonably consistent with the
innocence of the accused then this Court must hold
that there is not substanitial evidence to support the
· guilt of the accused. 97 Am. St. Rep. 776, Sec. 5 commencing 8th line.

The conclusion that a verdict of acquital should be directed
by the Court in the ca·se at bar is unsound because it is founded
8
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upon the faulty premise that the verdict was based solely upon
circumstantial evidence and not upon any direct evidence.
The trial record reveals that the State presented direct evidence
in addition to circumstanital evidence which was sufficient
to convict the defendant of grand larceny.
103-36-1, Utah Code Annotated 1943 defines larceny as
follows:
"Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying,
leading or driving away the personal property of another. Possession of property recently stolen, when
the person in possession fails to make a satisfactory
explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of
guilt."
The evidence of record clearly connects defendant with the
crime charged. The time of the burglary was established by
testimony of Daniel Dunn, Edward Peterson, and Clarence
Means as between 3:30 and 4:00 A.M. Daniel Dunn testified
he saw a car leave the alley by the tavern with a large object
in the trunk, and Edward Peterson testified he saw the same
car' license number 484, with an object in the trunk and two
men in the car, and the time established was just before 4:00
A.M. (Tr. 93, 94, 73, 74, 43, 44). Pursuit of the same car
with the object in the trunk by Officer Merrick was approximately 3: 50 A.M. Officer Merrick testified to following defendant in the car into an alley where defendant jumped from
the car and ran to avoid arrest. Officer Merrick gave chase,
fired two shots and defendant surrendered (Tr. 103-121).
The articles stolen from the tavern were found in defendant's car, the license of which bears the number 484. The
object in the trunk was identified as the television set taken

9
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from the tavern and,· with the other articles, identified at the
trial as exhibits A; B, C, D and E (Tr. 43-52, 106, 107, 122130). Defendant subsequently escaped (Tr. 117). Positive
idenification of defendant was made at the time of his arrest
and at the trial (Tr. 105, 119, 120, 121).
Respondent submits that the flight of the defendant,
chase by the Officer, apprehension and definite identification
of the defendant while in possession of recently-stolen goods,
and subsequent escape by defendant, was sufficient to go to
the jury and to sustain the verdict.

. POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO THE SCOPE OF EXAMINATION OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS; THE VERDICT
WAS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
On cross-examination defendant was asked and answered,
stating particular felonies. he had been convicted of previously,
and appellant cites as error the trial court's failure to instruct
the jury circumscribing their consideration of evidence as
to prior convictions.
This Court should note that the defense raised no objection at .the time the question as. to prior .convictions was propounded; also defense. did not request, . either orally or in
\Vriting, an instruction which WOuld clarify the COnsideration
to be give11: in the cross examination as to prior convictions.
Nor was ap.y objectiop..· made to the .instructions submitted to
10
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the jury by the court. Respondent submits that if error was
committed by omission of such an instruction, it was not such
as to be prejudicial to the defendant.
Appellant cites State t'. Coho ( 1936), 90 Utah 89, 60
P 2nd 952, as authority to relieve appellant of the technical
formalities required in a criminal case to properly present
and raise issues for argument before this Court. That case
involved a homicide charge. Because of the seriousness of
the charge, this Court there relaxed the formalities of objections and exceptions necessary to properly present arguments before this Court. We submit that in the case at bar
appellant's argument is not well taken.
Appellant also urges that the verdict of the jury was contrary to law and the evidence. There are numerous cases
which cite the rule that questions of fact are the sole prerogative of the jury. In the case of State v. Hitesman ( 1921), 58
Utah 62, 198 P. 769, a prosecution for larceny, this court
stated:
"While the law is to the effect that a· jury may not
arbitrarily ignore or disregard credible evidence, but
must consider all evidence, they, nevertheless, need
not blindly accept every explanation or statement that
the one who is accused of the larceny may make in his
own exculpation. The jury, in considering all the facts
and circumstances in evidence, rnay refuse to give
credence to defendant's statements or explanations,
or to those of his witnesses, if such statements or explanations, in view of all the facts and circumstances,
seem unreasonable or not well founded in fact. Where,
as here, property recently stolen is found in the possession of the accused, it is for the jury to say whether
his explanations and statements respecting that posses11
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sion are satisfactory or otherwise. See State v. Gurr,
40 Utah 162, 120 Pac. 209, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 320,
vthere the question is considered a.1d the authorities
supporting the foregoing statement of the law are
collated."
To the same effect see State v. Williams, ( 1917) 49 Utah
~·36, 164 Pac. 253.
Respondent contends that the evidence was sufficient to
go to the jury and that the verdict of the jury should not be
disturbed on appeal.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is submitted that the evidence in this
case fully supports the verdict and should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
FRANCIS C. LUND,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
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